November | 2018

Revitalizing Peace in South Sudan
Citizen Perceptions of the Peace Process

South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF)

Acknowledgements

About the SSCSF

The South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF) is a coalition of more than 200 independent civic groups, including civil society organizations, women and youth groups, academia, community-based organizations and faith-based organizations from across South Sudan. The coalition was established in December 2017 to provide unified contributions from civil society to the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) and to act as a bridge between the HLRF and the South Sudanese population.

SSCSF members work in both government and opposition-controlled areas, internally displaced person (IDP) camps, and South Sudanese refugee camps in neighboring countries. Members are united by a common interest in peace, freedom and respect for human dignity. The SSCSF derives its mandate from both its members and the thousands of ordinary citizens it consults with in regard to the peace process.

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CRA	Compensation and Reparations Authority
CTRH	Commission on Truth, Reconciliation and Healing
CTSAMM	Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism
FDs	Former Detainees
HCSS	Hybrid Court for South Sudan
HLRF	High-Level Revitalization Forum
IBC	Independent Boundaries Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
MP	Member of Parliament
NAS	National Salvation Front
NSS	National Security Services
OPP	Opposition Political Parties
POC	Protection of Civilian Site
POW	Prisoner of War
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
R-TGONU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
SSCSF	South Sudan Civil Society Forum
SSOA	South Sudan Opposition Alliance
SSTV	South Sudan Television
SSUM	South Sudan United Movement
TBC	Technical Boundary Committee
TGONU	Transitional Government of National Unity
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
USD	United States Dollar
VP	Vice President

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Executive Summary

<u>Background</u>
- On 12 September 2018, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU), an array of armed and political opposition groups, and other stakeholders signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).
- From October to November 2018, the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF), a coalition of more than 200 South Sudanese civic groups, surveyed 1,147 people in five locations in South Sudan and in a refugee camp in Uganda. The purpose of the survey was to assess citizen perspectives on the peace process and its outcome. This report presents the main findings and recommendations.

<u>Awareness and Confidence in the Peace Process</u>
- Overall, respondents expressed relatively high levels of awareness of the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). Eighty-three percent of respondents said that they were aware of the HLRF and 91 percent said that they were aware of the signing of R-ARCSS.
- When asked how well informed they were about the process, respondents were somewhat more equivocal. Fifty-eight percent said they felt well informed and 41 percent said they felt uninformed.
- Respondents appeared uncertain about the prospects for peace through the R-ARCSS. Less than half (43%) of respondents thought the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace, 37 percent thought it might bring lasting peace and 17 percent did not think it would not bring lasting peace.
- A lack of information was strongly correlated with more pessimistic views on prospects for peace. People who felt informed about the peace process were almost twice as likely (54%) to think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace than those that felt uniformed (28%).
- Major information gaps and more pessimistic attitudes about prospects for peace were apparent among refugees and women. These findings are particularly concerning given the importance of these stakeholder groups to the real and perceived success of the R-ARCSS.

<u>Perspectives on Governance Arrangements</u>
- Respondents overall expressed support for the R-ARCSS approach to power sharing. Sixty-one percent of respondents thought that a transitional government in which power was shared among the various armed groups would help to resolve the conflict. Just 15 percent of refugees, however, thought power sharing would help to resolve the conflict.
- While a majority of respondents supported power sharing, 59 percent were opposed to the idea of expanding the size of government to accommodate a power sharing arrangement.
- Overall, a slight majority of respondents (55%) thought that government and opposition leaders would be able to work together in a unity government. Respondents in Torit, Kiryandongo and Wau were considerably less optimistic about the leaders' ability to work together.
- Respondents in general, and women and refugees in particular, were uninformed

about the governance arrangements provided for in the R-ARCSS. Fifty-eight percent of respondents said they did not know the number of vice-presidents provided for in the R-ARCSS and 81 percent said they did not know the number of parliamentarians.

- When informed that the R-ARCSS increased the number of vice-presidents from two to five and the number of parliamentarians from 440 to 550, 65 percent of respondents said they opposed the decision to increase the number of vice-presidents and 62 percent said they opposed the decision to increase the number of parliamentarians.
- Respondents had a favorable view of the R-ARCSS provisions for increased women's participation in public office. Seventy-nine percent of respondents supported the R-ARCSS requirement to appoint one female vice-president.
- Three-quarters (75%) of respondents said they did not support the decision to create 32 states. Respondents were more equivocal about the decision to create their home state, though 49 percent of respondents were even opposed to the creation of their home state. Most respondents (57%) said there should be 10 states in South Sudan.
- More than a third of respondents (35%) admitted that they did not know how the R-ARCSS addresses the issue of the number of states. Another third (34%) thought that the agreement reverted to 10 states. Just 13 percent of respondents mentioned the creation of the Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC).

Perspectives on Security Arrangements
- Ninety percent of respondents said that people who violate the cessation of hostilities agreement should be subject to punitive measures. However, more than a third of respondents (37%) thought the parties had not violated the agreements to cease hostilities since September 2018, despite credible reports of violations from the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) and other independent organizations.
- A sizeable majority of respondents (77%) said that the parties should release political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) as required by the R-ARCSS. However, almost a third of respondents (30%) said they did not know whether the parties had released political detainees or POWs or not.
- A staggering 40 percent of respondents said that they or someone in their household knew women and children that had been abducted by armed groups since the conflict began in December 2013. An overwhelming majority (80%) of those who said they knew someone who had been abducted said that as far as they knew, the abducted person was still in captivity.
- Eighty-five percent of respondents said they support the demilitarization of civilian areas and 60 percent said they support the deployment of foreign troops to provide security during the transitional period. When asked which countries should provide troops, respondents emphasized the United States (62%), United Kingdom (41%) and Sudan (39%).
- However, respondents in different survey locations were sharply divided on whether neighboring countries should deploy troops. For example, 54 percent of respondents in Bentiu supported the deployment of Sudanese troops while not a single respondent in Bor supported their deployment. Conversely, 77 percent of respondents in Bor supported the deployment of Ugandan troops while just six percent of respondents in Bentiu supported their deployment.

- A considerable number of respondents expressed misunderstandings about the arms embargo that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) placed on South Sudan in July 2018. Thirty-six percent of respondents thought that no arms embargo had been put in place and 17 percent did not know one way or the other. When informed about the arms embargo, a sizeable majority of respondents (70%) said the decision to impose an arms embargo was the right decision.

Perspectives on Longer-term Issues
- Most respondents (69%), including 81 percent of female respondents, said they did not know the length of the transitional period as stipulated in the R-ARCSS. When asked how long they think the transitional period should be, respondents emphasized shorter time periods with 23 percent saying less than a year and just three percent saying five to six years.
- Forty-nine percent of respondents said that it was likely that there would be large-scale violence during elections and 45 percent said that it was unlikely. Responses varied widely across survey locations with Torit, Wau, Juba and Kiryandongo refugee settlement significantly more likely to think that there would be violence.
- Less than half (48%) of internally displaced and refugee respondents thought the R-ARCSS would create conditions conducive to their returning home, 11 percent said they did not think it would create conditions conducive to their returning home, and 41 percent said they did not know whether it would or not. When asked when they might return, almost one-third of respondents (32%) answered 'don't know', 23 percent said 'within the next year' and 22 percent said 'one to two years'.
- Seventy-six percent of respondents said that South Sudan needs a grassroots healing and dialogue process to bring lasting peace. However, there were considerable information gaps with respect to the National Dialogue, with 45 percent of respondents saying that they had not heard of the initiative.
- Respondent awareness of the transitional justice mechanisms described in Chapter V of the R-ARCSS reflect a similar knowledge gap. Just 34 percent of respondents said that they had heard of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and 33 percent of respondents said that they had heard of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). However, two-thirds (66%) of respondents who had heard of the proposed institutions said that the government should move more quickly to establish them.
- Respondents were dissatisfied with how the government has been managing oil revenue. Seventy-seven percent of respondents said the government was managing oil revenue 'poorly' (28%) or 'very poorly' (49%). When asked what should be done with oil revenue, respondents emphasized infrastructure (82%), education (80%) and health (78%). Just 20 percent of respondents said that it should be spent on the military.
- When asked to list key challenges for the transitional government moving forward, respondents emphasized inter-communal violence (42%), corruption (35%), return and resettlement of displaced populations (30%) and constitutional reform (30%).

Conclusion and Recommendations
- The crisis in South Sudan has reached a potential turning point. While the prospects for sustainable peace through the R-ARCSS remain uncertain, the agreement has

offered a glimmer of hope for the first time since the intensification of the conflict in 2016.

- The period leading to the establishment of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) in mid-2019 will be critical in determining whether the country can set itself back on the path to sustainable peace or whether it will experience a relapse into conflict.

- Survey findings suggest a number of ways in which the signatories, guarantors and supporters of the R-ARCSS can capitalize on the opportunities that the agreement has presented and overcome the challenges, including the following:

   1. Invest in robust civic engagement efforts to raise awareness and foster a sense of ownership over the R-ARCSS among citizens.
   2. Better publicize violations of the R-ARCSS and subject those responsible to punitive measures.
   3. Immediately release POWs, political detainees and abducted women and children, and provide information on the whereabouts of missing persons.
   4. Maintain open channels of communication with individuals and groups who have not signed on to the R-ARCSS.
   5. Ensure that the decision from the IBC on the number of states in South Sudan is responsive to citizen views on the issue.
   6. Embrace the arms embargo as a tool to facilitate the progressive demilitarization of society in South Sudan.
   7. Re-envision the National Dialogue to make it more inclusive and independent.
   8. Expedite the establishment of the transitional justice institutions provided for in Chapter V of the R-ARCSS.
   9. Subject decisions to deploy troops from neighboring countries in South Sudan to the highest levels of scrutiny.

Introduction

On 12 September 2018, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU), an array armed and political opposition groups, and other stakeholders signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).[1] Since the start of the war in December 2013, regional mediation efforts have been beset by challenges, but none more so than the inability of the parties to commit to the terms of a political settlement and permanent ceasefire. The delays in the process and the piecemeal implementation of agreements can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that negotiations have been taking place among a small number of elites in foreign capitals with little to no engagement of people in South Sudan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Since South Sudanese do not, by and large, feel a sense of ownership over the agreements that have been reached, the warring parties are able to violate them with little or no political cost.

Bridging the gap between the R-ARCSS and South Sudanese citizens should be an immediate priority as the parties move to implement this latest agreement. The parties' ability to meaningfully engage South Sudanese on what can be done to stabilize the situation will be a key factor in determining whether the R-ARCSS leads to a sustainable resolution to the conflict or is routinely violated as past agreements have been. In order to plan effectively for an evidence-based approach to civic engagement, the South Sudan Civil Society Forum (SSCSF), a coalition of more than 200 South Sudanese civic groups, surveyed 1,147 people in five locations in South Sudan and in a refugee camp in Uganda to measure citizen views of the peace process. In addition to providing baseline data from which to gauge perceptions of the peace process, the survey provided an opportunity for the SSCSF to begin engaging citizens in direct, face-to-face discussions about the way forward for South Sudan.

This report presents the main survey findings. After a brief overview of the survey methodology, the findings are presented across a range of thematic areas. The conclusion presents a series of recommendations for signatories, guarantors and supporters of the R-ARCSS on how to maximize the chances for successful implementation of the agreement. The period leading up to the establishment of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) will be a test of the parties' commitment to peace and their ability to make decisions in a deliberate and collective manner. By demonstrating leadership, a spirit of compromise, and a willingness to engage in open dialogue, the parties can demonstrate to their people and the broader international community that they are committed to opening a new page for South Sudan. We hope that the findings in this report can contribute to these efforts.

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[1] Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), IGAD (12 Sep 2018), https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/1950-signed-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-south-sudan. The R-ARCSS was signed by the TGONU, Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees, Opposition Political Parties (OPP) and other stakeholders. Three members of SSOA – the National Salvation Front (NSF), Popular Democratic Movement (PDM), and United Democratic Republic Alliance (UDRA) – and Pagan Amum of the FDs refused to sign the agreement.

1 Methodology

The survey was conducted over a two-month period in October and November 2018. In consultation with its members, the SSCSF developed a questionnaire consisting of 83 questions across a range of topics, including people's perceptions of the peace process, governance arrangements, security arrangements and longer-term issues (including institutional reforms, elections, subnational peacebuilding, constitutional development and transitional justice).

The sample was developed using a multi-stage sampling procedure. First, researchers chose six locations in South Sudan and Uganda using 'disproportionate allocation for between-strata analyses' that allowed for comparison within and between groups. Researchers tried to select survey sites that captured the diversity of South Sudan, represented a range of conflict-affectedness, and included areas where the SSCSF is planning civic engagement activities. Second, researchers selected households in each location using a random walk technique with a built-in skip pattern. Third, researchers identified participants in each household using the 'Hagan-Collier alternative' technique with fifty percent gender parity. Only individuals that were 18 years of age or older and South Sudanese nationals were included in the study.

A team of 14 enumerators (five women and nine men) was recruited to conduct interviews across the six survey locations. All enumerators were South Sudanese nationals, familiar with the local context, proficient in English and fluent in languages spoken by the respondents. Enumerators received three days of training on survey techniques and the protection of human subjects. Data was collected using the KoBoToolbox program for Android-based smartphones.[2] Interviews were conducted in private whenever possible, and all participants provided verbal informed consent to participate in the study.

A number of limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First, due to resource constraints, enumerators were not able to access many rural areas (aside from 27 interviews that were conducted in villages outside of Bor). As a result, the sample is skewed towards urban perceptions and it is likely that certain findings, such as those relating to awareness of peace processes, could change substantially if rural viewpoints were taken into consideration. Second, due to time and logistical constraints, enumerators were not able to negotiate access to United Nations (UN) protection of civilian (POC) sites in most locations (aside from 31 interviews conducted in Wau POC) or non-government controlled areas. Third, the survey included just one refugee settlement in Uganda and did not capture the viewpoints of the many hundreds of thousands of South Sudanese refugees living in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan or Kenya.

Taking these limitations into account, the sample does not claim to be statistically representative of South Sudanese views as a whole. Nonetheless, survey data accurately represents the views of the people with whom researchers spoke and can be used to inform subsequent programming.

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[2] KoBoToolbox is a suite of open source research tools designed to facilitate and improve data collection and analysis in complex environments. KoboToolbox website, http://www.kobotoolbox.org.

2 Survey Findings

2.1 Sample Characteristics

The survey sample was comprised of 1,147 individuals from six locations: Bentiu, Bor, Juba, Torit and Wau in South Sudan, and Kiryandongo refugee camp in Uganda (see Table 1).

Table 1: Sample Distribution in Project Areas

	Location	Country	Female		Male		Number (n)	Percent (pct.)
			n	pct.	n	pct.		
1	Bentiu	South Sudan	103	52	96	48	199	17
2	Bor	South Sudan	100	50	100	50	200	17
3	Juba	South Sudan	111	56	89	45	200	17
4	Kiryandongo	Uganda	93	53	84	48	177	15
5	Torit	South Sudan	106	47	119	53	225	20
6	Wau	South Sudan	81	56	65	45	146	13
		Total	**594**	**52**	**553**	**48**	**1,147**	**100**

Respondents were primarily urban based, with just three percent of respondents residing in rural areas outside of Bor and two percent residing in POCs. Seventy-seven percent of respondents were not displaced at the time the interviews were conducted, 15 percent were refugees (in Uganda) and eight percent were internally displaced persons (IDPs). Other characteristics of the sample include the following:

- Age range – 62 percent were 18 to 35 years of age, 28 percent were 36 to 55 years of age and 8 percent were 56 or older.[3]
- Household income – 14 percent had no income and 56 percent earned between 1 and 10,000 SSP per month (roughly $50 USD at the prevailing exchange rate) (see Figure 1).
- Ethnicity – 35 ethnic groups were represented in the sample, with the most populous being Dinka, Nuer, Lotuka, Acholi, Bari, Luo, Lopit and Fertit (see Table 2).

Figure 1: Household income (%)

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
[3] According to the 2008 census, 70 percent of the population in South Sudan is between the ages of 18 and 35. *See* South Sudan Factsheet, Youthpolicy.org, http://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/south-sudan/.

Table 2: Distribution of Ethnic Groups

Ethnic group	Acholi	Bari	Dinka	Fertit	Lopit	Lotuka	Luo	Nuer
Number	70	45	322	33	36	80	41	252
Percentage	6	4	28	3	3	7	4	22

2.2   Awareness of the Peace Process

Respondents overall expressed relatively high levels of awareness about the peace process and its outcome.[4] Eighty-three percent of respondents said that they were aware of the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) and 91 percent said that they were aware of the signing of R-ARCSS in September 2018. The HLRF has been a topic of conversation among South Sudanese since it was announced in June 2017, so these high levels of awareness are not altogether surprising. When asked how well informed they were about the process, however, responses were somewhat more equivocal, with 58 percent of respondents saying they felt either 'somehow' (44%) or 'very' (15%) well informed and 41 percent saying they felt either 'somehow' (29%) or 'very' (12%) uninformed. Responses to other questions about specific provisions in the R-ARCSS confirmed gaps in understanding about its contents as well.

Major gaps were apparent with respect to refugees and women. Sixty-one percent of refugees said they were not aware of the HLRF and 32 percent said they were not aware of the signing of the R-ARCSS (see Figure 2). Seventy percent of refugee respondents felt uninformed about the process compared to 37 percent of respondents in urban areas in South Sudan (see Figure 3). Women (54%) were more than twice as likely as men (26%) to feel uninformed about the process (see Figure 4).

Figure 2: Are you aware that a peace agreement (R-ARCSS) was signed between government and opposition groups in September 2018? vs. Displacement status (%)

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
[4] In response to an open question about what peace processes they were familiar with, most respondents mentioned the IGAD process (86%), followed by SPLM reunification (44%) and the National Dialogue (31%). The question was only asked to the 854 respondents who answered 'yes' to a preceding question about whether they were aware of any efforts to build peace in relation to the conflict that erupted in December 2013.

Figure 3: How well informed do you feel about the most recent peace talks (HLRF) that have been underway since December 2017? vs. Urbanicity (%)

Legend: Very uninformed | Somehow uninformed | Somehow well informed | Very well informed

Refugee camp: 29%, 41%, 21%, 3%
Urban: 9%, 28%, 46%, 17%
Total: 12%, 29%, 44%, 15%

Figure 4: How well informed do you feel about the most recent peace talks (HLRF) that have been underway since December 2017? vs. Gender (%)

Legend: Very uninformed | Somehow uninformed | Somehow well informed | Very well informed

Female: 15%, 39%, 37%, 7%
Male: 8%, 18%, 50%, 23%

Low levels of understanding among refugees and women are particularly concerning given the importance of these stakeholder groups to the real and perceived success of the R-ARCSS. Studies have shown that women's participation in peace processes leads to more sustainable outcomes, and the return of refugees to South Sudan will be an important indicator of a positive change in the security situation.[5] Moving forward, the parties and guarantors of the R-ARCSS should devote special attention to engaging these and other under-informed groups in a more concerted manner so as to foster a sense of ownership over the agreement among citizens.[6]

Respondent awareness of the parties participating in the HLRF process was mixed. When asked, "Please name the parties that you know of that have been participating in the peace talks," 80 percent mentioned the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) and 69 percent mentioned the TGONU, but none of the other opposition groups was mentioned by more than 15 percent of respondents. The fact that so few people were able to name the myriad of opposition groups participating in the peace talks reflects a more general confusion about the proliferation of armed groups since the signing of the previous agreement in August 2015.

The sources from which most people received information on the peace process included

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[5] *See* Melanne Verveer and Anjali Dayal, *Women are the Key to Peace*, Foreign Policy (8 Nov. 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/women-are-the-key-to-peace/.
[6] Other populations that may warrant special attention include those in POC camps and rural peripheries in South Sudan. Unfortunately, the survey did not include a sizeable enough sample from these populations to draw authoritative conclusions about their levels of awareness of the peace process.

radio in South Sudan (64%), word of mouth (63%) and South Sudan Television (SSTV) (27%).[7] Thirty-one percent of respondents said they receive information through social media, including Facebook (15%), WhatsApp (5%), Twitter (1%) and other social media (10%). Youth (19%) are more than twice as likely to receive information through Facebook than middle-aged adults (9%) and about six times more likely than elders (3%). Radio in South Sudan was the most trusted source of information (according to 40% of respondents) and word of mouth was the least trusted source of information (according to 57% of respondents).

2.3 Confidence in the Peace Process and the R-ARCSS

Respondents were generally uncertain about the prospects for sustainable peace through the R-ARCSS. When asked, "Do you think the peace agreement that was signed in Addis Ababa in September 2018 will bring lasting peace to South Sudan," just 43 percent of respondents said 'yes', while 37 percent said 'maybe' and 17 percent said 'no'. Respondents in Bentiu, Bor and Wau were the most optimistic, those in Kiryandongo refugee settlement were the most uncertain, and those in Torit were the most pessimistic (see **Error! Reference source not found.**).

Figure 5: Do you think that the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) that was signed in September 2018 will bring lasting peace? vs. Location (%)

Men (54%) were more likely to think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace than women (34%) (see Figure 6). This can be attributed, in part, to information gaps among women. Indeed, respondents who felt as though they were 'somehow' or 'very well' informed were twice as likely to think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace than those that felt 'somehow' or 'very' uniformed (see Figure 7). The diverging viewpoints along gender lines may also reflect the violence directed against women, children and more vulnerable populations, coupled with their lack of agency in the context of the conflict, which may make it more difficult for them to be optimistic about the prospects for peace.

Figure 6: Do you think the peace agreement that was signed in September 2018 (R-ARCSS) will bring lasting peace? vs. Gender (%)

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
[7] SSTV is a state-run television network in South Sudan.

In response to a question about whether they thought their interests as a citizen of South Sudan were represented in the process, 56 percent of respondents said 'yes', 31 percent said 'no' and 13 percent said, 'don't know.' Respondents were then read a list of all the stakeholders that participated in the HLRF and asked which actors represented their interests as a citizen of South Sudan in the peace process. Overall, respondents expressed the most confidence in TGONU (44%) and SPLM-IO (42%), followed by faith leaders (32%), women's representatives (27%), civil society (25%) and youth representatives (23%), with progressively less confidence expressed for other armed and political opposition groups (see Figure 8). The higher levels of support expressed for civic actors speaks to their contributions in terms of technical expertise and building trust among the parties during the HLRF process. This contrasts with the previous IGAD mediation effort (2014-15) in which civil society space was largely coopted by groups aligned with the government and SPLM-IO.[8]

Figure 8: Which of the following actors represented your interests as a citizen of South Sudan in the peace process (HLRF)? (%)

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
[8] Jérôme Tubiana, *Civil Society and the South Sudan Crisis*, International Crisis Group (ICG) (14 Jul. 2014), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/civil-society-and-south-sudan-crisis.

There was considerable divergence of opinion about the various armed and political groups along geographic (and ethnic) lines (see Figure 9). Whereas respondents overall expressed the most confidence in the TGONU and SPLM-IO, just 15 percent of respondents in Kiryandongo refugee settlement thought the TGONU represented their interests in the peace process and just 15 percent of respondents in Juba thought SPLM-IO represented their interests. Conversely, while just 16 percent of respondents overall said that the National Salvation Front (NAS), led by Thomas Cirillo, represented their interests, 50 percent of respondents in Torit said that NAS represented their interests. Similarly, 28 percent of respondents in government-controlled Bentiu town said that the South Sudan United Movement (SSUM), led by Peter Gadet, represented their interests, compared to just eight percent of respondents overall. The divergence of viewpoints along geographic and ethnic lines illustrates the depth of the political divide in South Sudan and the scale of the task that lies ahead for reconciliation efforts.

Figure 9: Which of the following actors represented your interests in the peace process (HLRF)? vs. Location (%)

There are also correlations between whether respondents think that particular actors represented their interests in the peace process and whether they think the R-ARCSS will bring lasting peace. For example, respondents who thought that the TGONU or SPLM-IO represented their interests in the peace process were twice as likely to think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace than those that did not think the TGONU or SPLM-IO represented their interests (Figure 10). Meanwhile, those who said that NAS, who did not sign on to the R-ARCSS, represented their interests, were considerably more likely to say that the R-ARCSS would not bring lasting peace (36%) than those who said that the TGONU (15%) or the SPLM-IO (20%) represented their interests.

Figure 10: Do you think the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) bring lasting peace? vs. Which actor represented your interests? (%)

Similarly, less populous ethnic groups also tended to be less optimistic about the prospects for peace through the R-ARCSS than more populous groups. Among the Lopit and Lotuka of Eastern Equatoria, for example, 53 percent of respondents said that they did not think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace, whereas among the Dinka and Nuer, only 8 and 12 percent of respondents respectively did not think that the R-ARCSS would bring lasting peace (see Figure 11).[9]

Figure 11: Do you think the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) that was signed in September 2018 will bring lasting peace? vs. Ethnicity (%)

These findings may reflect perceptions of who is winning or losing as a result of the R-ARCSS and fears among minority ethnic groups about the prospect of Dinka and Nuer hegemony through the R-ARCSS. In order to assuage these fears and instill a sense of ownership over the peace process among these groups, proponents of the R-ARCSS should promote messaging that emphasizes win-win outcomes and the opportunities that the R-ARCSS presents for people irrespective of their ethnic background or political persuasion. Opposition groups that did not sign on to the R-ARCSS should also be brought into discussions about the way forward so as not to perpetuate pessimistic attitudes among them and their supporters.

2.4 Perspectives on Power Sharing

The R-ARCSS is premised on a power sharing arrangement that would expand the government in order to accommodate armed and political opposition groups. The structure of government was a topic of much debate during the pre-HLRF consultations, and stakeholders presented a range of viewpoints ranging from governance models that would exclude individuals who have served in office in the past to models focused more on political accommodation. Ultimately, the R-ARCSS adopted an approach to power sharing that is very similar to the August 2015 peace agreement and the origins of which lie in the power sharing formula of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Most respondents were supportive of the power sharing approach, though a substantial number also voiced their disapproval. In response to a closed question about whether they thought a transitional government in which power was shared among the various armed groups would help to resolve the conflict, 61 percent said 'yes', 26 percent said 'no', and 13

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[9] The optimism about the prospects for peace among the Fertit is an outlier in this respect and additional research would be needed to determine why they place so much confidence in the R-ARCSS relative to other minority groups.

percent said 'don't know'. However, there was a stark difference among refugees, only 15 percent of whom thought a power sharing approach would resolve the conflict (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Do you think a transitional government in which power is shared among the various armed groups will help to resolve the conflict? vs. Displacement status (%)

Respondents were also presented with five governance models and asked to select the one that would be most able to bring peace to South Sudan. The five models, taken from proposals that South Sudanese stakeholders presented to mediators during the pre-HLRF consultations, were as follows:

1. <u>Status quo</u> – Comprised of the incumbent TGONU and excluding the armed and political opposition groups.
2. <u>Power sharing, open elections</u> – Comprised of the incumbent TGONU and opposition groups followed by elections in which anyone is free to contest.
3. <u>Power sharing, TGONU officials ineligible to contest in elections</u> – Comprised of the incumbent TGONU and opposition groups, but anyone who serves in the R-TGONU would be ineligible to contest in elections.
4. <u>Technocratic government</u> – Excludes individuals who have served in government since 2005 from the R-TGONU but allows anyone to compete in elections at the end of the transitional period.
5. <u>International administration</u> – An intergovernmental body such as the United Nations (UN) or African Union (AU) would assume responsibility for governing South Sudan over a transitional period followed by elections in which the government would revert to national control.

Again, most respondents (46%) opted for the R-ARCSS model of a power sharing government followed by elections in which anyone can compete (see Figure 13). However, refugees were less likely to support the status quo and more likely to support the model that provided for a power sharing arrangement during the transitional period followed by elections in which individuals serving in the transitional government would be ineligible (see Figure 14).[10]

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[10] A similar trend was apparent among respondents who felt as though NAS represented their interests in the peace process.

Figure 13: Which of the following types of transitional government do you think would be most able to bring peace (%)

	Status quo, incumbent govt	Power sharing, open elections	Power sharing, TGONU officials can't contest elections	Technocratic govt	Int'l administration
%	13	46	15	13	6

Figure 14: Which of the following types of transitional government would be most able to bring peace vs. Displacement status (%)

	Status quo, incumbent govt	Power sharing, open elections	Power sharing, TGONU officials can't contest elections	Technocratic govt	Int'l administration
Currently a refugee	12	28	23	16	7
Currently an IDP	17	42	14	11	9
Not currently displaced	13	50	13	12	6

In practice, the viability of a power sharing approach rests on the ability of government and opposition parties to work together in a unity government. Despite the violent internal power struggles that broke out in 2013 and 2016, a majority of respondents (55%) overall said that they thought government and opposition leaders would be able to work together moving forward. Not surprisingly, respondents who thought that government and opposition leaders could work together were far more likely to support power sharing (80%) than those that did not think they could work together (39%) (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: Do you think government and opposition leaders can work together in the transitional government? vs. Do you think power sharing will help resolve the conflict? (%)

	No, they can't work together	Yes, they can work together
Support power sharing	39	80
Oppose power sharing	52	15

However, diverging viewpoints were evident in Torit, Wau and Kiryandongo refugee settlement where substantial numbers of respondents either did not think that government and opposition leaders could work together or were uncertain whether they would be able to work together (see Figure 16). Disaggregating the data by displacement status highlights the

gap with respect to refugees, less than a quarter of whom thought government and opposition leaders would be able to work together (see Figure 17).

Figure 16: Do you think government and opposition leaders can work together in the transitional government? vs. Location (%)

Figure 17: Do you think government and opposition leaders work together? vs. Displacement status (%)

2.5 Size and Structure of Government

According to the R-ARCSS, the composition of the R- TGONU is as follows:

- Office of the President – Three additional vice-presidential positions are added to Office of the President, which will now be comprised of the President, First Vice-President and four Vice-Presidents. President Salva Kiir retains his position as President, Dr. Riek Machar is reinstated as First Vice-President and the remaining positions are nominated by TGONU (two positions), South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) (one position) and the Former Detainees (FDs) (one position). The candidate nominated by the FDs must be a woman.
- Ministries – The number of ministries is increased from 30 to 35, with 20 ministerial portfolios going to the incumbent TGONU, nine to the SPLM-IO, three to SSOA, two to the FDs and one to the Opposition Political Parties (OPP). The parties must appoint no fewer than 12 women as ministers.
- Legislature – The Legislative Assembly is expanded from 440 to 550 members with 332 positions going to the incumbent TGONU, 128 positions going to SPLM-IO, 50 positions going to SSOA, 30 positions going to OPP and 10 to the FDs.

Whereas respondents overall expressed a preference for a power sharing governance model, they also expressed resistance to the notion of expanding the size of government to

accommodate the power sharing approach. When told that the peace agreement increases the size of government and asked whether they think that was the right decision, 59 percent of respondents said they did not support the decision, and just 39 percent said that they supported the decision.

While most respondents (67%) were aware that the R-ARCSS expands the size of government, there was less awareness (42%) of number of vice-presidents provided for in the R-ARCSS. The gap was particularly pronounced for women, 74 percent of whom did not know the number of vice-presidents compared to just 40 percent of men (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Do you know how many VPs are provided for in the peace agreement (R-ARCSS)? vs. Gender (%)

Of those that said they knew the number of vice-presidents, a sizeable majority (81%) correctly put the number at five. The high levels of accuracy among those who were aware of the vice-presidential arrangement points to the notoriety that the proposal received when it was first introduced in the latter stages of the HLRF. When told that the R-ARCSS increases the number of vice-presidents from two to five and asked if they think that was the right decision, 65 percent of respondents said 'no'.

Respondent views on increasing the size of the legislature followed a similar pattern. Eighty-one percent of respondents said they did not know the number of members of parliament (MPs) provided for in the R-ARCSS, and when told that the R-ARCSS increased the number of MPs from 440 to 550, 62 percent of respondents said they opposed the decision. Of those that said they knew the number of MPs, 65 percent correctly placed the number at 550. Again, the information gap was most pronounced among women, 94 percent of whom did not know the number of MPs compared to 66 percent of men (see Figure 19).

Figure 19: Do you know how many MPs are provided for in the peace agreement (R-ARCSS)? vs. Gender (%)

Respondent discontent with the number of vice-presidents, MPs, and more broadly with the creation of more and more positions to accommodate opposition groups, may reflect a perception that the parties were primarily interested in receiving or maintaining positions through the HLRF and only secondarily on restoring peace to South Sudan in the long-term. The parties should engage citizens in dialogue on this issue as part of the constitutional development process outlined in Ch. VI of the R-ARCSS in order to achieve more of a consensus on the governance arrangements that people think should be put in place after elections.

Unlike the expansion of government to accommodate politicians and generals, respondents had a favorable view of the R-ARCSS provisions for increased women's participation in public office. Seventy-nine percent of respondents supported the R-ARCSS requirement to appoint one female vice-president. However, there was somewhat less awareness of the requirement for women to be appointed to at least 35 percent of the positions, including 12 of the 35 ministerial positions. When asked, "As far as you know, does the peace agreement require the government and opposition to appoint a certain number of women in the transitional government," 24 percent of respondents thought that no such requirement existed, and 15 percent of respondents did not know one way or the other. Of those that said they knew about the requirement, just 30 percent correctly put the number at 35 percent of positions. When people are not aware of important requirements such as these, policy-makers can ignore them more easily in practice.

2.6   Number of States and Federalism

Among the most contentious issues in the HLRF discussions was the number of states that would be put in place during the transitional period. The R-ARCSS resolves the issue by delegating the decision to an Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) that was to be constituted within two weeks of the signing of the agreement.[11] The IBC's mandate is "to consider the number of States of the Republic of South Sudan, their boundaries, the composition and restructuring of the Council of States," and the parties are obliged to abide by the IBC's recommendations.[12] Once constituted, the IBC will be given 90 days to complete its work and if it fails to make its final report in this period, will be automatically transformed into a commission responsible for conducting a national referendum on the number of states.

As the R-TGONU cannot be established until the number of states is determined, a timely decision on this issue is of central importance to the viability of the R-ARCSS. Survey respondents expressed strong disapproval for the 32 states, with three-quarters (75%) of

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[11] A November 2018 communiqué from the IGAD Council of Ministers urges the African Union (AU) and Troika (United States, United Kingdom and Norway) to make their nominations to the IBC and TBC to enable the institutions to execute their mandate. Communiqué of the 66th Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on Somalia and South Sudan (16 Nov. 2018), https://www.igad.int/attachments/article/1994/Communique%20of%20the%2066th%20Extra-Ordinary%20Session%20of%20IGAD%20Council%20of%20Ministers.pdf.

[12] *See* R-ARCSS, Ch. I, Art. 1.15. Alongside the IBC, the R-ARCSS calls for the establishment of a Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) "to define and demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1 January 1956 and the tribal areas in dispute in the country." The TBC is given 60 days to complete its work and the IBC is obliged to take the TBC report into account when rendering its decision on the number of states. *See* R-ARCSS, Ch. I, Art. 1.15.18.

respondents saying they did not support the decision to create 32 states. Disaggregating by ethnicity shows consistent majorities in opposition to the 32 states across the most populous eight ethnic groups in the sample (see Figure 20). When asked, "How many states should there be in South Sudan," most (57%) respondents said 10 (see Figure 21).

Figure 20: Do you support the decision to create 32 states? vs. Ethnicity (%)

Figure 21: How many states should there be in South Sudan? (%)

Regarding the decision to create their home state, respondents were more equivocal, though 49 percent of respondents were still opposed the decision to create their home state. Figure 22 shows support for the creation of respondents' home states for the five states in which the survey was carried out.

Figure 22: Do you support the decision to create your home state? vs. Home state (%)

Most respondents who support the decision to create the 32 states cite self-governance and administrative separation from difficult neighboring communities as reasons for their support (see Figure 23). Respondents said they opposed the decision to create 32 states because of boundary disputes, the risk of undermining national unity, and the unviability of smaller states (see Figure 24).

Figure 23: Why do you support the decision to create 32 states? (%)

Gives our community right to administer itself	79
Frees us from problematic neighboring community	59
Forces people to return to home areas	53
Brings govt closer to the people	49
Creates more positions to distribute	38
It's within power of govt to make the choice	31
Don't know	7

Figure 24: Why do you oppose the decision to create 32 states? (%)

Disagreements over boundaries	61
Will undermine national unity	60
Smaller states not viable	57
Unconstitutional	14
Other	4
Don't know	3

Despite strong opposition to the creation of the 32 states, respondents were largely uninformed about how the R-ARCSS addresses the dispute over the number of states. More than a third of respondents (35%) admitted that they did not know how the R-ARCSS addresses the dispute over the number of states. Another third (34%) thought that the agreement reverted to 10 states. Just 13 percent of respondents mentioned the creation of the IBC (see Figure 25).

Figure 25: As far as you know, how does the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) address the dispute over the number of states? (%)

Don't know	35
Reverts to 10 states	34
Retains 32 states	18
Establishes commission to make determination	13
Creates 3 regional administrations	5
Other	1

The issue of federalism was also a contentious issue in the context of the HLRF discussions. Although the parties "reaffirm their commitment" in the R-ARCSS to establish a federal system of government during the constitution-making process, the groups that refused to sign the R-ARCSS did so in part because it did not sufficiently provide for a federal system of government over the transitional period.

Survey findings suggest some division of opinion on whether a federal system of government should be put in place. Although a majority (62%) of respondents said that governance in South Sudan should be based on a federal system, 30 percent opposed federalism and eight percent did not know whether a federal system should be put in place or not. Divergent perspectives were apparent across survey locations, with the strongest support for federalism in Torit and the strongest opposition in Kiryandongo refugee settlement and Wau (see Figure 26). There was also a strong correlation between respondents who felt as though NAS, who refused to sign the R-ARCSS in part because they felt it did not sufficiently provide for a federal system, represented their interests in the peace process and whether the respondent thought governance in South Sudan should be based on a federal system (see Figure 27).

Figure 26: Do you think governance in South Sudan should be based on a federal system? vs. Location (%)

**Figure 27: Do you think governance should be based on a federal system? vs. Whether NAS represented your interests in peace process (%)**

When asked what they think are the essential attributes of a federal system, respondents cited a range of issues, suggesting a divergence of viewpoints on what federalism actually entails (see Figure 28).

Figure 28: In your view, what are the essential components of a federal system? (%)

2.7 Enforcement of Commitments to Cease Hostilities

Enforcing compliance with commitments to cease hostilities in the agreements that have been reached through the peace process has been among the most difficult tasks for IGAD.[13] A cessation of hostilities agreement, signed on 21 December 2017, refers to a November 2014 communiqué from the IGAD Heads of State and Government, in describing the types of punitive measures that IGAD would impose on individuals or groups that violate the agreement:

> Any violation of the cessation of the hostilities by any party will invite the following collective action by the IGAD region against those responsible for such violations, which will include, but are not limited to:
> a. the enactment of asset freezes
> b. the enactment of travel bans within the region
> c. denial of the supply of arms and ammunition, and any other material that could be used in war.[14]

Although several violations have been documented by Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) and others since the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018, including recent violence in Yei and Wau, there was some disagreement among respondents about whether the parties had actually violated the cessation of hostilities agreement.[15] Fifty-four percent of respondents said that the parties had violated the agreement since September 2018, 37 percent said that they had not, and 9 percent said that they did not know whether the parties had violated the agreement or not. The fact that one-third of respondents thought the parties had not violated the agreement points to shortcomings in the public dissemination of reports of violations from independent bodies such as CTSAMVM. Raising awareness about the violations that are taking place could help to increase the political costs associated with those violations.

Despite the different viewpoints on whether violations had taken place, respondents overwhelmingly supported the imposition of punitive measures on parties who violate the cessation of hostilities agreement. Ninety percent of respondents said that parties that violate the cessation of hostilities agreement should be subject to punitive measures. Most respondents emphasized criminal prosecution as the most appropriate punitive measure for individuals or groups that violate the agreement (see Figure 29).

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[13] In addition to the latest cessation of hostilities agreement signed in December 2017, commitments to cease hostilities were confirmed in the permanent ceasefire agreement signed in Khartoum and incorporated into the final R-ARCSS.

[14] Communiqué of the 31st Extra-Ordinary Summit of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Heads of State and Government on South Sudan (12 Jun. 2018), https://igad.int/attachments/article/1575/120617_Communique%20of%20the%2031st%20Extra-Ordinary%20IGAD%20Summit%20on%20South%20Sudan.pdf; *see also* High Level Revitalization Forum, *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and Humanitarian Access* (21 Dec 2017), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64322.

[15] CTSAMVM Report (No. 1) to R-JMEC Plenary (19 Nov. 2018) (on file with SSCSF).

Figure 29: What punitive measures should parties that violate the cessation of hostilities agreement be subject to? (%)

The parties have struggled to implement commitments made under both the December 2017 cessation of hostilities agreement and under the R-ARCSS to release political detainees, prisoners of war and women and children who were abducted by armed groups. The cessation of hostilities agreement requires the parties to release the following persons to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) without delay:

(a) any persons who has been deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the conflict;
(b) any Prisoners of War (POWs);
(c) all political prisoners and detainees;
(d) All abducted women and children.[16]

While most respondents were aware of the R-ARCSS requirement to release political detainees and POWs, nearly one-quarter of respondents (24%) did not know about the requirement. Women (32%) were more than twice as likely as men (14%) to say that they did not know about this provision in the R-ARCSS (see Figure 30). Moreover, when asked, "As far as you know, have the warring parties released political detainees and POWs," 22 percent of respondents said 'yes' and 30 percent said 'don't know'.[17] A sizeable majority of respondents (77%) thought that the parties should release political detainees and prisoners of war as required by the R-ARCSS.

Figure 30: As far as you know, does the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018 require the warring parties to release political detainees and POWs? vs. Gender (%)

When asked whether they know any women or children abducted by armed groups since the

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[16] *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities*.
[17] The survey took place before the 31 October 2018 peace celebration in which the President announced that he would be releasing two high profile detainees – James Gadet and William Endley. This event therefore did not have an effect on people's responses.

conflict began in 2013, a staggering 40 percent of respondents said 'yes'. Respondents in Bentiu (68%), Wau (60%) and Bor (56%) – areas that have experienced some of the highest levels of direct violence since the conflict began – were more likely to say 'yes' than other locations (see Figure 31). When asked if the abductees have been released, 80 percent of those who said they knew someone who had been abducted said 'no'.

Figure 31: Do you know any women or children that have been abducted by armed groups since the conflict erupted in December 2013? vs. Location (%)

2.8   Provision of Security and Arms Embargo

The heavy deployment and close proximity of government and SPLM-IO forces in Juba was among the factors that led to the outbreak of violence in 2016. Although the R-ARCSS does not explicitly call for the demilitarization of Juba and other urban centers, as did the ARCSS, it does call for the demilitarization of urban areas, which it defines to include: "schools, service centers, occupied houses, IDP camps, protection of civilian sites, villages, churches, mosques, ritual centers and livelihood areas."[18]

Respondents overwhelmingly supported the demilitarization of civilian areas during the transitional period, with 85 percent voicing their approval for the idea. Sixty percent of respondents supported the deployment of foreign troops to provide security during the transitional period, with the greatest support for the idea in Torit (87%) and Bentiu (77%) and the greatest opposition to the idea in Bor (70%) (see Figure 32).

Figure 32: Do you support the deployment of foreign troops to provide security during the transitional period? vs. Location (%)

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
[18] *See* R-ARCSS, Ch. II, Art. 2.2.3.1.

When asked which of a list of countries should provide troops, respondents emphasized the United States (62%), United Kingdom (41%) and Sudan (39%) (see Figure 33). That Sudan would be the third most popular country to deploy troops to South Sudan may speak to the role that Sudan played along with Uganda in convincing the parties to sign the R-ARCSS in the latter stages of the HLRF. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have also not engaged directly in the conflict to date, unlike troops from the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), for whom just 13 percent of respondents supported their deployment.

Figure 33: Which of the following countries do you think should deploy troops to provide security? (%)

Views on this issue diverged sharply across survey locations. For example, 54 percent of respondents in Bentiu supported the deployment of Sudanese troops and not a single respondent supported their deployment in Bor (see Figure 34). Conversely, 77 percent of respondents in Bor supported the deployment of Ugandan troops while just six percent of respondents in Bentiu supported their deployment. Further research would be needed to understand the basis for these viewpoints, but the higher level of support for the deployment of the SAF in Bentiu could relate to a possible role for Sudan in securing the Unity oilfields, while the higher support for the UPDF in Bor could point the role that UPDF played in recapturing and defending Bor alongside government forces in the early stages of the conflict.

Figure 34: Support for deploying troops from Sudan and Uganda vs. Location (%)

Legend: ■ Support SAF deployment ■ Support UPDF deployment

Location	Support SAF deployment	Support UPDF deployment
Bentiu	54	6
Bor	0	77
Juba	32	23
Kiryandongo	25	4
Torit	50	2
Wau	38	9

In July 2018, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2428 putting in place an arms embargo on South Sudan.[19] While a sizeable portion of respondents (47%) were aware of the arms embargo, more than a third of respondents (36%) did not think that an arms embargo had been put in place and 17 percent of respondents did not know one way or the other. Again, the knowledge gap was most pronounced among women, 29 percent of whom did not know about the arms embargo compared to just four percent of men (see Figure 35).

Figure 35: As far as you know, has South Sudan been subject to a UN arms embargo? vs. Gender (%)

Legend: ■ Yes ■ No ■ Don't know

| Gender	Yes	No	Don't know
Female	37	34	29
Male	58	38	4
Total	47	36	17

After being told that the UNSC imposed an arms embargo in July 2018, a sizeable majority of respondents (70%) said the UNSC made the right decision. Support was consistently high for the arms embargo across survey locations with the exception of Bor, where a large majority (74%) of respondents were opposed to the arms embargo (see Figure 36). The opposition in Bor may be traced to the fact that the bulk of security provision, particularly in rural parts of Jonglei state, is provided by armed youth, and they may be concerned that they could lose access to weapons and ammunition as a result of the arms embargo.

Figure 36: Support for arms embargo vs. Location (%)

Legend: ■ Yes ■ No ■ Don't know

Location	Yes	No	Don't know
Bentiu	76	20	3
Bor	25	74	2
Juba	85	15	1
Kiryandongo	69	25	6
Torit	91	8	0
Wau	73	25	2
Total	70	28	2

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[19] *See* UNSC Resolution 2428, UN Doc. S/RES/2428 (13 Jul. 2018), https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/s/res/2428%282018%29.

The considerable support across the survey sample as a whole may suggest that people appreciate the value of an arms embargo in supporting efforts to demilitarize society and do not see it as a simple punitive measure. The more that state and non-state actors involved with awareness raising around the peace process can emphasize these types of narratives, the more incentive the government will have to use the arms embargo as a reason to begin channeling revenue away from the military and towards other priority areas, such as infrastructure, health and education.

2.9 Length of the Transition, Elections and Return and Resettlement

The R-ARCSS provides for an eight-month pre-transitional period followed by a three-year transitional period.[20] Elections are to be held 60 days before the end of the transitional period, or in March 2022, if the parties adhere to the current timeline.[21] Most respondents (69%), including 81 percent of female respondents, said they did not know the length of the transitional period as stipulated in the R-ARCSS (see Figure 37). Of those respondents who said they knew the length of the transitional period, 64 percent correctly put the figure at three years. When asked how long they think the transitional period should be, respondents emphasized the shorter time periods with 23 percent saying less than a year and just three percent saying five to six years (see Figure 38).

Figure 37: Do you know the length of the transitional period stipulated in the peace agreement (R-ARCSS) signed in September 2018? vs. Gender (%)

Figure 38: How long should the transitional period be? (%)

The elections that are to be held at the end of the transitional period are among the potential trigger points for violence. When asked how likely they think it is that there will be large-scale violence during elections, 49 percent of respondents said either likely (34%) or very likely (15%) and 45 percent said either unlikely (30%) or very unlikely (15%). Responses varied widely across survey locations with Torit, Wau, Juba and Kiryandongo refugee settlement

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[20] *See* R-ARCSS, Ch. I, Art. 1.1.2.
[21] *See id.*, Art. 1.1.5.

significantly more likely to think that there would be violence (see Figure 39).

Figure 39: How likely do you think it is that there will be large-scale violence during the elections? vs. Location (%)

Very likely | Likely | Unlikely | Very unlikely

The return of IDPs and refugees to their homes will be an important early indicator that the situation in South Sudan is stabilizing. There was considerable uncertainty among displaced populations about the prospects for returning to their homes. When asked, "Do you think the peace agreement signed in September 2018 will create conditions conducive to your returning home," 48 percent of IDP and refugee respondents said 'yes', 11 percent said 'no', and 41 percent said 'don't know'. When asked when they might return, almost one-third of IDP and refugee respondents (32%) again answered 'don't know', 23 percent said 'within the next year' and 22 percent said 'one to two years' (see Figure 40). The high levels of uncertainty are not surprising given the difficulty that the warring parties have had in agreeing on the terms of a political settlement and permanent ceasefire.

Figure 40: When do you think you might return? (%)

2.10 National Dialogue, Transitional Justice and Constitutional Reform

In December 2015, the President launched a National Dialogue in an effort to further national healing, peace and reconciliation, among other objectives. [22] The initiative has received criticism for being insufficiently inclusive and independent and as a result has not secured strong backing from most bilateral or multilateral partners. Nonetheless, the National Dialogue Steering Committee has conducted a series of local consultations in South Sudan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries and plans to hold regional conferences building to a national conference sometime in the first half of 2019.

Survey respondents were generally appreciative of the importance of dialogue and subnational peacebuilding efforts as a necessary complement to the R-ARCSS. Seventy-six percent of respondents said that South Sudan needs a grassroots healing and dialogue process

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[22] Website of the South Sudan National Dialogue, https://www.ssnationaldialogue.org.

to bring lasting peace. There were, however, considerable information gaps with respect to the National Dialogue. Forty-five percent of respondents said that they had not heard of the National Dialogue, including 77 percent in Kiryandongo refugee settlement and 75 percent in Bentiu (see Figure 41). Sixty-six percent of men said they had heard of the National Dialogue compared to just 44 percent of women, and 15 percent of respondents said that they or someone in their household had engaged with representatives of the National Dialogue.

Figure 41: Have you heard of National Dialogue? vs. Location (%)

When asked, "Do you think the National Dialogue as currently conceived can help to address the problem of conflict in South Sudan," 52 percent of respondents said 'yes'. Respondents who had heard of the National Dialogue (64%) were far more likely to think that the National Dialogue could help to address the problem of conflict than respondents who had not heard of the National Dialogue (39%). Similarly, people who had engaged with representatives of the National Dialogue (80%) were considerably more likely to think it could help to address the problem of conflict than those that had not engaged with representatives of the National Dialogue (48%) (see Figure 42). As with the overall awareness of the peace process, these findings suggest that raising levels of awareness about these processes can have a major impact in terms of raising people's confidence in them.

Figure 42: Do you think the National Dialogue can help to address the problem of conflict in South Sudan? vs. Have you or anyone in your household ever engaged with representatives of the National Dialogue? (%)

Respondent awareness with the transitional justice mechanisms described in Chapter V of the R-ARCSS reflect a similar knowledge gap. Just 34 percent of respondents said that they had heard of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and 33 percent of respondents said that they had heard of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). The lack of awareness was most pronounced in Kiryandongo refugee settlement, where 90 percent of respondents had not heard of the HCSS and 96 percent had not heard of the CTRH, and among

women, of whom 76 percent had not heard of the two institutions compared to 57 percent of men. However, two-thirds (66%) of respondents who had heard of the proposed institutions said that the government should move more quickly to establish them.

The main opposition to the expedited establishment of the two bodies was found in Bor and Bentiu (see Figure 43). Additional research would be required to parse the reasoning behind these responses, but they may point to support in these locations for politicians or military leaders that are thought to be responsible for abuses elsewhere. Indeed, respondents who felt as though the TGONU and SPLM-IO represented their interests in the peace process were less likely to support the expedited establishment of the HCSS than those who did not feel as though the two groups represented their interests in the peace process. However, in both cases, convincing majorities still thought the government should move more quickly to establish the court (see Figure 44 and Figure 45).

Figure 43: Do you think the government should move more quickly to establish the Hybrid Court? vs. Location (%)

Figure 44: Do you think the government should move more quickly to establish the Hybrid Court? vs. Whether TGONU represented your interests in peace process (%)


Figure 45: Do you think the government should move more quickly to establish the Hybrid Court? vs. Whether SPLM-IO represented your interests in peace process (%)


Lastly, in relation to constitutional reform, respondents were asked, "Do you think the

permanent constitution should be subject to a referendum by the people?" Such referenda have been used in other contexts such as Columbia and Kenya in order to confer greater democratic legitimacy on the constitution. Eighty-four percent of respondents supported the idea of subjecting the constitution to a referendum in South Sudan.

## 2.11 Governance Priorities and Oil Revenue

The longer-term viability of peace efforts in South Sudan will be as much tied to economic issues as to reconciliation among the leadership and people. As almost all revenue is derived from oil production, the R-TGONU will need to implement progressive reforms in the sector to ensure that it delivers better returns for the people of South Sudan. When asked how well they thought the government was managing oil revenue, 77 percent of respondents said 'poorly' (28%) or 'very poorly' (49%) (see Figure 46).

Figure 46: How well do you think the government is managing the oil sector? (%)

However, when asked whether they would support subjecting oil revenue to international oversight, a majority of respondents (58%) said 'no', suggesting that sentiments of national pride still figure quite prominently in people's views of how the oil sector should be managed. Responses varied considerably across survey locations, from a low of five percent of respondents in Kiryandongo refugee settlement supporting the idea of subjecting oil revenue to international oversight to a high of 62 percent of respondents in the oil-producing area of Bentiu (see Figure 47).

Figure 47: Do you support subjecting oil revenue to international oversight? vs. Location (%)

When asked what should be done with oil revenue, respondents emphasized infrastructure (82%), education (80%) and health (78%) (see Figure 48). Just 20 percent of respondents said that it should be spent on the military, which currently receives the bulk of national revenue.

In terms of key challenges for the transitional government moving forward, inter-communal violence was the most common response (42%), followed by corruption (35%), return and resettlement of displaced populations (30%) and constitutional reform (30%) (see Figure 49).

**Figure 48: What do you think should be done with oil revenue? (%)**

Figure 49: What do you think the key challenges are for the transitional government moving forward? (%)

Conclusion and Recommendations

The signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018 represents a potential turning point for the conflict in South Sudan. While the prospects for sustainable peace through the R-ARCSS remain uncertain, the agreement has offered a glimmer of hope that has been lacking since the intensification of the conflict in 2016. South Sudanese must be proactive and assume responsibility for the peace process if the R-ARCSS is to deliver on its promises. The period leading to the establishment of the R-TGONU scheduled for mid-2019 will be critical in determining whether the country can set itself back on the path to sustainable peace or whether it will experience a relapse into conflict.

The parties will be faced with both opportunities and challenges in their efforts to implement the agreement. The opportunities include a semblance of political will that has emerged somewhat unexpectedly in the latter stages of the HLRF, a regional consensus that South Sudan's neighbors can make a constructive contribution to peace efforts if they are able to speak with a united voice, and a domestic population in South Sudan that is tired of war and has begun to demand better of its leaders. The gaps include a lack of knowledge among

citizens about how the R-ARCSS attempts to resolve the underlying political grievances, diverging perspectives on the viability of the agreement and ongoing violations that are not being addressed.

Survey findings suggest a number of ways in which the signatories, guarantors and supporters of the R-ARCSS can capitalize on these opportunities and overcome the challenges, including the following:

1. ***Invest in robust civic engagement efforts to raise awareness and foster a sense of ownership over the R-ARCSS among citizens.*** Survey data demonstrates extensive gaps in people's knowledge about the R-ARCSS. The data also shows that people who are more informed about the agreement are more likely to have positive views about the prospects for peace. The incumbent TGONU, opposition groups and guarantors of the agreement should immediately initiate a robust civic engagement effort in order to instill a sense of ownership over the R-ARCSS among the population in South Sudan and in refugee camps in neighboring countries.

   The parties should take advantage of citizen trust in radio as a source of information and use radio platforms to start a national conversation on what needs to be done to restore peace and stability. They should invite civic actors to supplement these efforts by disseminating copies of the R-ARCSS and conducting awareness-raising campaigns across the country. Special attention should be devoted to engaging women, refugees and other populations that may be under-informed or pessimistic about the prospects for peace.

   The creation of safe public spaces for dialogue is of central importance. Restrictions on the freedom of assembly, such as the prevailing requirement to obtain approval from the National Security Services (NSS) before holding any public event or threatening to deny the registration of organizations that speak out in the public interest, have stoked fears among civic actors and encouraged self-censorship. The parties can create an environment that is more conducive to open and honest dialogue if they assure people that their right to discuss the R-ARCSS in a safe and open manner will be respected and protected.

2. ***Better publicize violations of the R-ARCSS and subject those responsible to punitive measures.*** Survey data shows widespread support for subjecting individuals and groups who violate the cessation of hostilities agreement to punitive measures. Signatories to the R-ARCSS are primarily responsible for acknowledging any violations committed by their forces and holding the responsible individuals to account. If the parties were able to do this in a consistent manner, it could help to boost citizen confidence in their willingness to implement the R-ARCSS. To the extent that the parties are unable or unwilling to acknowledge violations, IGAD member states have a responsibility to step in and impose punitive measures on the responsible actors.

   Survey data shows fundamental gaps in people's knowledge of whether agreements are being violated or not. Given the high levels of illiteracy and low internet penetration in South Sudan, online reporting by the CTSAMVM alone cannot bring

sufficient attention to the violations that are taking place. CTSAMVM should work more closely with civic actors to uncover violations, determine who is responsible and make recommendations for how they might be addressed.

3. ***Immediately release POWs, political detainees and abducted women and children and provide information on the whereabouts of missing persons.*** Although the parties to the R-ARCSS have made some progress in releasing POWs and political detainees in recent months, a number of high-profile actors remain in detention or otherwise unaccounted for, including Peter Biar Ajak, Dong Samuel Luak and Aggrey Idri. Survey data also reaffirms pre-existing reports of large numbers of women and children being held captive by various armed groups across the country. The release of these individuals and the provision of information on the whereabouts of those who are unaccounted for would not only provide immediate relief for their family and friends, it would also be a powerful demonstration of the seriousness of the parties to implement the R-ARCSS.

4. ***Maintain open channels of communication with individuals and groups who have not signed on to the R-ARCSS.*** Survey data demonstrates sharply diverging viewpoints on key issues among populations in different geographic locations and those who subscribe to different political viewpoints. The incumbent TGONU and opposition groups that are signatories to the R-ARCSS should continue peaceful dialogue with individuals and groups who are not satisfied with the R-ARCSS in order to see how their concerns can be accounted for moving forward. Any effort to defeat these groups militarily would just lead to more suffering and could put the R-ARCSS in jeopardy.

5. ***Ensure that the decision from the IBC on the number of states in South Sudan is responsive to citizen views on the issue.*** Since the decision to create the 32 states, South Sudanese have been told that it was a response to a popular demand from the people. Survey data suggests that a large portion of the population may actually be opposed to the decision and would prefer to revert to the pre-existing 10-state model. Rather than continuing to politicize the issue, the parties should try to better understand citizen views on this issue and instruct their representatives in the IBC to act in accordance with those views, whether or not they adhere to the party position on the matter. Methods for popular consultations on this issue should be incorporated into the IBC's operating procedures such that a timely decision can be reached on this issue, paving the way for the establishment of the R-TGONU.

6. ***Embrace the arms embargo as a tool to facilitate the progressive demilitarization of society in South Sudan.*** When the UNSC placed an arms embargo on South Sudan in July 2018, the immediate reaction from the TGONU was to resist what was seen to be an unjust infringement on its right to acquire weapons. While this reaction is understandable given the context, the arms embargo is now a reality that South Sudan must contend with. Rather than spending more money trying to acquire weapons through illicit means, the TGONU should accept the arms embargo and use restrictions on arms sales as a means of diverting revenue towards more productive things, such as the return and resettlement of displaced populations and humanitarian assistance for its people. IGAD member states should encourage the TGONU to adopt this

approach and avoid actions that would undermine the arms embargo.

7. ***Re-envision the National Dialogue to make it more inclusive and independent.*** On 31 October 2018, South Sudanese leaders and foreign dignitaries gathered to celebrate the recent signing of the R-ARCSS. In his speech to a crowd of many thousands of South Sudanese, President Kiir appealed to opposition groups to join the National Dialogue and pledged to consider changes to the initiative to make it more appealing to them.[23] Survey data demonstrates the importance of such a grassroots dialogue and healing process to sustainable peace, but without buy-in from the population as a whole, the National Dialogue will not be able to fulfill its purpose.

   To make the body more independent and credible, the National Dialogue should be established through legislation by the Revitalized Legislative Assembly and should be reconstituted to be more representative of the country as a whole. The reformed National Dialogue should build on the work that has already been done by the Steering Committee and seek to engage people on the provisions of the R-ARCSS alongside a discussion on how to secure lasting peace in the longer-term.

8. ***Expedite the establishment of the transitional justice institutions provided for in Chapter V of the R-ARCSS.*** It will take generations to address the legacies of violence in South Sudan, and the institutions provided for in Chapter V of the R-ARCSS provide a valuable starting point. The parties to the R-ARCSS, with the support of civic actors, should make more of an effort to raise awareness about the HCSS, CTRH and the Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA) and ensure that the institutions proceed in a manner that is meaningful to South Sudanese. The TGONU should establish these institutions without further delay such that they can operationalize themselves over the transitional period and complete their work under the elected government that is to follow.

9. **Subject any decision to deploy troops from neighboring countries to the highest levels of scrutiny.** The four frontline states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan all have strong bilateral interests that could lead to real or perceived bias were they to play a security role in South Sudan. As the guarantors of the R-ARCSS and relevant multilateral institutions make decisions about the troop deployments to South Sudan, they should carefully consider the risks of including troops from these countries.

   Survey data demonstrates sharply diverging viewpoints on whether Sudan, in particular, should deploy troops to South Sudan, with respondents in some locations expressing robust support for the idea and respondents in other locations expressing a strong refusal. Given the atrocities committed by Sudanese troops in South Sudan throughout the 22-year war (1983-2005), any decision to allow them to deploy troops should be subject to the highest levels of scrutiny.

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[23] *See* Speech of H.E. The President on the Occasion of the Celebration of the Revitalized Peace Agreement, 31 Oct. 2018, Juba (on file with SSCSF).

Annex – Signatories

1. African Youth Action Network (AYAN)
2. Ana Taban Arts Initiative
3. Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA)
4. Association of Facebookers, Tweeters and Bloggers of South Sudan (AFTABOSS)
5. Catwalk to Freedom
6. Centre for Inclusive Governance, Peace and Justice (CIGPJ)
7. Centre for Peace and Justice (CPJ)
8. Church Leaders Initiative for Peace (CLIP)
9. Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)
10. Crown the Woman (CREW)
11. Dialogue and Research Initiative (DRI)
12. Eve Organization
13. Foundation for Democratic and Accountable Governance (FODAG)
14. Institute of Social Policy and Research (ISPR)
15. International Youth for Africa (IYA)
16. National Alliance for Women Lawyers (NAWL)
17. Okay Africa Foundation
18. Organization for Responsive Governance (ORG)
19. Remembering the Ones We've Lost (ROWL)
20. Solidarity Ministries Africa for Reconciliation and Development (SMARD)
21. South Sudan Democratic Engagement Monitoring and Observation Programme (SSUDEMOP)
22. South Sudan Law Society (SSLS)
23. South Sudan Action Network for Small Arms (SSANSA)
24. South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy (SSHURSA)
25. South Sudan Women's Empowerment Organization (SSWEN)
26. South Sudan Youth Peace and Development Organization (SSYPADO)
27. Soweto Community-Based Organization (SCBO)
28. Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)
29. Women's Monthly Forum
30. Young Women Christian Association (YWCA)
31. Youth Engagement for Sustainable Society (YESS)